Inequality, Coalitions and Collective Action

Pranab Bardhan and Nirvikar Singh

Department of Economics, Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley

Abstract: In a model where cooperation is beneficial, but subject to cheating, and is supported by trigger strategy punishments in a repeated game, we explore the relationship between the nature of cooperation (size and composition of coalitions) and underlying inequality in the distribution of private productive assets.

Keywords: inequality; self-enforcing; collective action; infrastructure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-05-18
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Inequality, Coalitions and Collective Action (2004)
Working Paper: Inequality, Coalitions and Collective Action (2004)
Working Paper: Inequality, Coalitions and Collective Action (2004)
Working Paper: Inequality, Coalitions and Collective Action (2004)
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