Bidder Preferences Among Auction Institutions

Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel and Tim Salmon

Experimental from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This study examines bidder preferences between alternative auction institutions. We seek to experimentally characterize the degree to which bidders prefer an ascending auction to a sealed bid auction. We find very strong ceteris paribus preferences for the ascending institution with bidders choosing it overwhelmingly often when entry prices for the two auctions are the same. When the entry prices of the two auctions differ, many subjects can be shown to be willing to pay more to enter the ascending auction than is explainable by their risk attitudes when accounting for their expectations about the risk preferences of their opponents.

Keywords: auctions; mechanism design; electronic markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2004-04-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-exp
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 18
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (32)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Bidder Preferences among Auction Institutions (2004)
Working Paper: Bidder preferences among auction institutions (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpex:0404005

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