Bidder Preferences among Auction Institutions

Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel and Tim Salmon

Economic Inquiry, 2004, vol. 42, issue 2, 223-236

Abstract: This study examines bidder preferences between alternative auction institutions. We seek to characterize experimentally the degree to which bidders prefer an ascending auction to a sealed bid auction. We find very strong ceteris paribus preferences for the ascending institution with bidders choosing it overwhelmingly often when entry prices for the two auctions are the same. When the entry prices of the two auctions differ, many subjects can be shown to be willing to pay more to enter the ascending auction than is explainable by their risk attitudes when accounting for their expectations about the risk preferences of their opponents. (JEL C91, D44) Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.

JEL-codes: C91 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)

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Working Paper: Bidder Preferences Among Auction Institutions (2004)
Working Paper: Bidder preferences among auction institutions (2002)
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