On the Dynamic Foundation of Evolutionary Stability in Continuous Models
Jörg Oechssler and
Frank Riedel ()
Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany
We show in this paper that none of the existing static evolutionary stability concepts (ESS, CSS, uninvadability, NIS) is sufficient to guarantee dynamic stability in the weak topology with respect to standard evolutionary dynamics if the strategy space is continuous. We propose a new concept, evolutionary robustness, which is stronger than the previous concepts. Evolutionary robustness ensures dynamic stability for replicator dynamics in doubly symmetric games.
Keywords: replicator dynamics; evolutionary stability; ESS; CSS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo
Note: Type of Document - ; pages: 26
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Journal Article: On the Dynamic Foundation of Evolutionary Stability in Continuous Models (2002)
Working Paper: On the Dynamic Foundation of Evolutionary Stability in Continuous Models (2000)
Working Paper: On the dynamic foundation of evolutionary stability in continuous models (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0004004
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