Room Assignment-Rent Division: A Market Approach

Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Tayfun Sönmez and Utku Unver
Additional contact information
Atila Abdulkadiroglu: Columbia University

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: A group of friends consider renting a house but they shall first agree on how to allocate its rooms and share the rent. We propose an auction mechanism for room assignment-rent division problems which mimics the market mechanism. Our auction mechanism is efficient, envy-free, individually-rational and it yields a non-negative price to each room whenever that is possible with envy-freeness.

JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-02-13, Revised 2004-02-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Note: Type of Document - Adobe pdf; prepared on IBM PC - PC- TEX/Scientific WorkPlace;
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/game/papers/0202/0202003.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Room assignment-rent division: A market approach (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0202003

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany
Bibliographic data for series maintained by EconWPA ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).