Room assignment-rent division: A market approach

Atila Abdulkadiroğlu (), Tayfun Sönmez and Utku Unver

Social Choice and Welfare, 2004, vol. 22, issue 3, 515-538

Abstract: A group of friends consider renting a house but they shall first agree on how to allocate its rooms and share the rent. We propose an auction mechanism for room assignment-rent division problems which mimics the market mechanism. Our auction mechanism is efficient, envy-free, individually-rational and it yields a non-negative price to each room whenever that is possible with envy-freeness. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0231-0

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