Buyer feedback as a filtering mechanism for reputable sellers

Paolo Laureti, Frantisek Slanina, Yi-Kuo Yu and Yi-Cheng Zhang

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We propose a continuum model for the description of buyer and seller dynamics in an Internet market. The relevant variables are the research effort of buyers and the sellers' reputation building process. We show that, if a commercial website gives consumers the possibility to rate credibly sellers they bargained with, vendors are forced to be more honest. This leads to mutual beneficial symbiosis between buyers and sellers; the overall enhanced volume of transactions contributes ultimately to the website, which facilitates the matchmaking service.

Keywords: Asymmetric information; Internet commerce; Reputation mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C39 C49 C73 D52 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2003-07-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-net
Note: Type of Document - Postscript; prepared on linux; to print on PostScript; pages: 19; figures: included. Published on Physica A 316 (2002) 413
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Working Paper: Buyer feedback as a filtering mechanism for reputable sellers (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0307001

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