Correlated Equilibria of Classical Strategic Games with Quantum Signals

Pierfrancesco La Mura

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Correlated equilibria are sometimes more efficient than the Nash equilibria of a game without signals. We investigate whether the availability of quantum signals in the context of a classical strategic game may allow the players to achieve even better efficiency than in any correlated equilibrium with classical signals, and find the answer to be positive.

Keywords: strategic games; quantum mechanics; correlated equilibrium; coordination; entanglement; efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 2003-09-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 8
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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Working Paper: Correlated Equilibria of Classical Strategic Games with Quantum Signals (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0309001

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