Correlated Equilibria of Classical Strategic Games with Quantum Signals

Pierfrancesco La Mura

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Correlated equilibria are sometimes more efficient than the Nash equilibria of a game without signals. We investigate whether the availability of quantum signals in the context of a classical strategic game may allow the players to achieve even better efficiency than in any correlated equilibrium with classical signals, and find the answer to be positive.

Date: 2003-09
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Published in Int. J. Quantum Inform., 03, 183 (2005)

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