A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets

Federico Echenique and Jorge Oviedo

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The usual core may be empty. The setwise-stable set coincides with the pairwise-stable set, and with the predictions of a non-cooperative bargaining model. The set-wise stable set possesses the canonical conflict/coincidence of interest properties from many-to-one, and one-to-one models. The theory parallels the standard theory of stability for many-to-one, and one-to- one, models. We provide results for a number of core-like solutions, besides the setwise-stable set.

Keywords: many-to-many matchings; substitutability; tarski fixed point theorem; setwise stability; core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
Date: 2004-01-18
Note: Type of Document - pdf; prepared on linux; to print on postscript; pages: 45
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets (2006)
Working Paper: A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets (2005)
Working Paper: A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets (2003)
Working Paper: A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0401002

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