A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets

, () and , ()
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,: California Institute of Technology
,: Universidad Nacional de San Luis, Argentina
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Jorge Oviedo and Federico Echenique

Theoretical Economics, 2006, vol. 1, issue 2, 233-273

Abstract: We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The usual core may be empty. The setwise-stable set coincides with the pairwise-stable set and with the predictions of a non-cooperative bargaining model. The setwise-stable set possesses the conflict/coincidence of interest properties from many-to-one, and one-to-one models. The theory parallels the standard theory of stability for many-to-one, and one-to-one, models. We provide results for a number of core-like solutions, besides the setwise-stable set.

Keywords: Two-sided matching; cooperative game theory; core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-06-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (112)

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Related works:
Working Paper: A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets (2005)
Working Paper: A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets (2004)
Working Paper: A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets (2003)
Working Paper: A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:the:publsh:139

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