An Algorithm for Stable and Equitable Coalition Structures with Public Goods

Fan-chin Kung

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We study the formation of coalitions that provide public goods to members. Individuals are linked on a tree graph and those with similar preferences are connected on the tree. We present a solution that selects allocations belonging to the coalition structure core and that are also envy-free.

Keywords: Coalition formation; coalition structure core; envy-free; public goods; mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-09-12, Revised 2005-06-21
Note: Type of Document - pdf
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: An Algorithm for Stable and Equitable Coalition Structures with Public Goods (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0409007

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