An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction
Vijay Krishna and
Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany
We study the war of attrition and the all-pay auction when players' signals are affiliated and symmetrically distributed. We (a) find sufficient conditions for the existence of symmetric monotonic equilibrium bidding strategies; and (b) examine the performance of these auction forms in terms of the expected revenue accruing to the seller. Under our conditions the war of attrition raises greater expected revenue than all other known sealed bid auction forms.
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9409002
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