Efficiency Does Not Imply Immediate Agreement
Sergiu Hart () and
Additional contact information
Zohar Levy: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany
Gul (Econometrica, 1989) introduces a non-cooperative bargaining procedure and claims that the payoffs of the resulting efficient stationary subgame perfect equilibria are close to the Shapley value of the underlying transferable utility game (when the discount factor is close to 1). We exhibit here an example showing that efficiency, even for strictly super-additive games, does not imply that all meetings end in agreement. Thus efficiency does not suffice to get Gul's result.
JEL-codes: C71 C72 D4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Note: Type of Document - Scientific Word 2.5 (LaTeX). See also:
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: Efficiency Does Not Imply Immediate Agreement (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9709001
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany
Bibliographic data for series maintained by EconWPA ().