Evolutionary Dynamics on Infinite Strategy Spaces

Jörg Oechssler and Frank Riedel

Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The study of evolutionary dynamics was so far mainly restricted to finite strategy spaces. In this paper we show that this restriction is in most cases unnecessary. We give a mild condition under which the continuous time replicator dynamics are well defined for infinite strategy spaces. Furthermore, we provide conditions for stability of rest points. Finally, we apply this general theory to a number of applications like the Nash demand game, the War of Attrition, Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly games, and mixed strategies.

Keywords: replicator dynamics; evolutionary stability; continuous strategy spaces; oligopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 1998-05-08, Revised 1998-08-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-gth
Note: pages: 26
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9805002

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