Market Share Superstition (Letter)
J. Armstrong ()
General Economics and Teaching from University Library of Munich, Germany
Anterasian et al. (1996) present a one-sided argument that the use of market share as an objective is detrimental. Because two-sided arguments are persuasive for intelligent audiences, one might wonder why they chose a one-sided approach. Having spent the past decade working on this topic, I conclude that the reason is simple: There is no contradictory evidence. Substantial and growing evidence suggests that market share objectives harm the performance of firms. Given more space, the authors could have provided even more evidence. For example, game theory studies show that competitive objectives are harmful to oneself.
Keywords: market share; superstition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Market Share Superstition (Letter) (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpgt:0412032
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