Damages and Injunctions in Protecting Proprietary Research Tools

Mark Schankerman and Suzanne Scotchmer
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Mark Schankerman: London School of Economics

Law and Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We investigate how liability rules and property rules affect the incentives to invest in research tools. We argue that it is hard to deter infringement under any of the enforcement regimes available. However, counter-intuitively, a credible threat of infringement can actually be beneficial to the patent holder. We compare the two doctrines of damages under the liability rule, namely, lost profit (lost royalty) and unjust enrichment, and argue that unjust enrichment protects the patent holder better than lost royalty. Both can be superior to a property rule (the right to enjoin infringement), depending on how much delay is permitted before infringement is enjoined. We also show that, for patents on end-user products, the ranking of liability doctrines is reversed: unjust enrichment is inferior to lost profits.

JEL-codes: K0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2001-01-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
Note: 36 pages, Acrobat .pdf
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/econ-wp/le/papers/0012/0012002.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Damages and Injunctions in Protecting Proprietary Research Tools (2000)
Working Paper: Damages and Injunctions in Protecting Proprietary Research Tools (2000)
Working Paper: Damages and injunctions in protecting proprietary research tools (2000)
Working Paper: Damages and Injunctions in Protecting Proprietary Research Tools (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwple:0012002

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