Social norms and human cooperation

Ernst Fehr and Urs Fischbacher

Macroeconomics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The existence of social norms is one of the big unsolved problems in social cognitive science. Although no other concept is invoked more frequently in the social sciences, we still know little about how social norms are formed, the forces determining their content, and the cognitive and emotional requirements that enable a species to establish and enforce social norms. In recent years, there has been substantial progress, however, on how cooperation norms are enforced. Here we review evidence showing that sanctions are decisive for norm enforcement, and that they are largely driven by nonselfish motives. Moreover, the explicit study of sanctioning behavior provides instruments for measuring social norms and has also led to deeper insights into the proximate and ultimate forces behind human cooperation.

Keywords: Social Norms; Cooperation; Punishment; Reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 6 pages
Date: 2004-09-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cbe, nep-evo and nep-hpe
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 6
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (255)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0409026

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