Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players

Matthew Jackson and Simon Wilkie

Microeconomics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding offers of strategy contingent side payments before the game is played. This does not always lead to efficient outcomes, despite complete information and costless contracting. The characterizations are illustrated in a series of examples, including voluntary contribution public good games, Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly, principal-agent problems, and commons games, among others.

Keywords: game theory; mechanism design; contracts; side payments; endogenous games; public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 H41 K12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-11-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-law and nep-pbe
Note: Type of Document - pdf
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players (2005)
Working Paper: Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0211008

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