Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players

Matthew Jackson and Simon Wilkie

The Review of Economic Studies, 2005, vol. 72, issue 2, 543-566

Abstract: We characterize the outcomes of games when players may make binding offers of strategy contingent side payments before the game is played. This does not always lead to efficient outcomes, despite complete information and costless contracting. The characterizations are illustrated in a series of examples, including voluntary contribution public good games, Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly, principal-agent problems, and commons games, among others. Copyright 2005, Wiley-Blackwell.

Date: 2005
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Working Paper: Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players (2002)
Working Paper: Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players (2002)
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