Un modelo de decisión judicial previsional argentino
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Carlos Salomón: Universidad de San Andrés
Microeconomics from University Library of Munich, Germany
Following the separation of powers' models, this paper analyzes the behaviour of the Supreme Court in the Social Security's case Rolon Zappa (1986). Besides judicial independence, I suppose that the economic, social and legal conditions of the case influence the utility of the judges. I develop a game between five players: the Supreme Court, the Social Security Administration, the pensioner, the Executive and the Congress. As a result, the Court, at least in this particular case, acted strategically; had a long run horizont and did not take into account the macroeconomic and social context of that period.
Keywords: judicial game; separation of powers models; supreme court behaviour (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2005-11-05, Revised 2006-04-02
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 30. Es un juego entre cuatro
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0511001
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