Panu Poutvaara ()
Public Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany
The mobility of labor reduces national incentives to invest in internationally applicable education. Such effects may be especially severe for the prospective new member states of the European Union. The European Union could overcome this by allowing countries to institute graduate taxes or income-contingent loans, collected also from migrants. This paper presents calculations on how such a system could look like for Finland, as well as discusses its implementation. Such contracts could be voluntary, education financed publicly only for those accepting also to share the returns. With EU enlargement, such reforms could generate a triple dividend.
Keywords: graduate taxes; European Union; individual accounts; income- contingent loans; migration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H24 H52 I28 F22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec and nep-pub
Note: Type of Document - Pdf; prepared on IBM PC ; to print on Xerox3N1; pages: 37 ; figures: none. Available also as CEBR DP 2003-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0302008
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