Educating Europe

Panu Poutvaara

No 1114, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: The mobility of labor reduces national incentives to invest in internationally applicable education. The European Union could overcome this by allowing member states to institute graduate taxes or income-contingent loans, collected also from migrants. This paper presents calculations on how a graduate tax system could look for Finland. To protect citizens against Leviathan governments, graduate taxes or income-contingent loans could be based on voluntary contracts. Education would then be financed publicly only for those accepting also to share the returns. With EU enlargement, such reforms could generate a triple dividend.

Keywords: graduate taxes; European Union; individual accounts; income-contingent loans; migration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F22 H24 H52 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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Working Paper: Educating Europe (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1114

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