Fiscal Rules for Subnational Governments. Some organizing principles and Latin American experiences

Miguel Braun and Mariano Tommasi

Public Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper we investigate the logic and the workings of fiscal rules, with focus on rules for subnational governments. We argue against a simplistic view that sees the writing of numerical limits on fiscal variables as the solution to fundamental fiscal problems. We suggest that international organizations should take a more comprehensive approach when dealing with the fiscal problems of developing countries. Such an approach requires a deep understanding of the determinants of undesirable fiscal outcomes in each particular case, which in turn requires some explicit political analysis.

Keywords: fiscal rules; fiscal policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D6 D7 H (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2004-10-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lam and nep-pbe
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 41
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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Working Paper: Fiscal Rules for Subnational Governments. Some Organizing Principles and Latin American Experiences (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0410004

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