Fiscal Rules for Subnational Governments. Some organizing principles and Latin American experiences
Miguel Braun and
Mariano Tommasi ()
Public Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany
In this paper we investigate the logic and the workings of fiscal rules, with focus on rules for subnational governments. We argue against a simplistic view that sees the writing of numerical limits on fiscal variables as the solution to fundamental fiscal problems. We suggest that international organizations should take a more comprehensive approach when dealing with the fiscal problems of developing countries. Such an approach requires a deep understanding of the determinants of undesirable fiscal outcomes in each particular case, which in turn requires some explicit political analysis.
Keywords: fiscal rules; fiscal policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D6 D7 H (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lam and nep-pbe
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 41
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Fiscal Rules for Subnational Governments. Some Organizing Principles and Latin American Experiences (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0410004
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Public Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany
Bibliographic data for series maintained by EconWPA ().