Fiscal Rules for Subnational Governments. Some Organizing Principles and Latin American Experiences

Mariano Tommasi and Miguel Braun

No 44, Working Papers from Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia

Abstract: In this paper we investigate the logic and the workings of fiscal rules, with focus on rules for subnational governments. We argue against a simplistic view that sees the writing of numerical limits on fiscal variables as the solution to fundamental fiscal problems. We suggest that international organizations should take a more comprehensive approach when dealing with the fiscal problems of developing countries. Such an approach requires a deep understanding of the determinants of undesirable fiscal outcomes in each particular case, which in turn requires some explicit political analysis.

Keywords: fiscal rules; subnational governments; Latin America (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2002-03, Revised 2002-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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https://repec.udesa.edu.ar/pub/econ/doc44.pdf First version, 2002 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Fiscal Rules for Subnational Governments. Some organizing principles and Latin American experiences (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sad:wpaper:44

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