Preventing competition because of “solidarity”: Rhetoric and reality of airport investments in Spain
Germà Bel () and
Public Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany
Spain is the only large European country in which airport management is strictly centralized and publicly owned. This peculiar institutional setting prevents competition among Spanish airports, and policy makers and bureaucrats in charge of the system regularly justify it on grounds of interterritorial solidarity. This paper tests whether allocation of investments in airports is effectively based on redistributive purposes, as claimed and looks at other factors to explain such allocation. Our empirical analysis suggests that neither a progressive redistribution target nor the scale economies criterion explain allocation decisions. Instead, we find that political factors have significant influence on the allocation decisions made by the government.
Keywords: Public Enterprise; Legal monopolies; Air Transportation; Models with Panel Data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L32 L43 L93 C23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 25
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Journal Article: Preventing competition because of 'solidarity': rhetoric and reality of airport investments in Spain (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0511012
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Public Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany
Bibliographic data for series maintained by EconWPA ().