Negative Voters: Electoral Competition with Loss-Aversion

Ben Lockwood and James Rockey

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies how voter loss-aversion affects electoral competition in a Downsian setting. Assuming that the voters’ reference point is the status quo, we show that loss-aversion has a number of effects. First, for some values of the status quo, there is policy rigidity both parties choose platforms equal to the status quo, regardless of other parameters. Second, there is a moderation effect when there is policy rigidity, the equilibrium policy outcome is closer to the moderate voters’ ideal point than in the absence of loss-aversion. In a dynamic extension of the model, we consider how parties strategically manipulate the status quo to their advantage, and we find that this increases policy rigidity. Finally, we show that with loss-aversion, incumbents adjust less than challengers to changes in voter preferences. The underlying force is that the status quo works to the advantage of the incumbent. This prediction of asymmetric adjustment is new, and we test it using elections to US state legislatures. The results are as predicted: incumbent parties respond less to shocks in the preferences of the median voter.

Keywords: electoral competition; loss-aversion; incumbency advantage; platform rigidity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-mic, nep-pol and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/w ... rp_1063_lockwood.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Negative Voters? Electoral Competition with Loss-Aversion (2020)
Working Paper: Negative Voters? Electoral Competition with Loss-Aversion (2020)
Working Paper: Negative Voters: Electoral Competition with Loss-Aversion (2015)
Working Paper: Negative Voters: Electoral Competition with Loss-Aversion
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:1063

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