Negative Voters? Electoral Competition with Loss-Aversion

Ben Lockwood and James Rockey

No 14289, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper studies the effect of voter loss-aversion in preferences over both candidate policy platforms and candidate valence on electoral competition. Loss-aversion over platforms leads to both platform rigidity and reduced platform polarisation, whereas loss-aversion over valence results in increased polarization and also the possibility of asymmetric equilibria with a self-fulfilling (dis)-advantage for the incumbent. The results are robust to a stochastic link between platforms and outcomes; they hold approximately for a small amount of noise. A testable implication of loss-aversion over platforms is that incumbents adjust less than challengers to shifts in voter preferences. We find some empirical support for this using data for elections to the US House of Representatives.

Keywords: Electoral competition; Loss-aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Negative Voters? Electoral Competition with Loss-Aversion (2020)
Working Paper: Negative Voters: Electoral Competition with Loss-Aversion (2015)
Working Paper: Negative Voters: Electoral Competition with Loss-Aversion
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