Manipulative Disclosure

Claudio Mezzetti

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies disclosure of verifiable information by a privately informed expert. It shows that if the direction of the expert’s bias is uncertain, then a positive measure of expert types manipulate the decision maker fully, inducing her to choose their ideal outcome. Most other types manipulate partially. The decision maker obtains her first best outcome only if the expert is unbiased or the state of the world is a boundary point of the state space and the expert prefers a more extreme outcome. Experts benefit from being poker faced and the decision maker’s lack of familiarity with the problem.

Keywords: Verifiable disclosure of information; experts and decision makers; manipulation; pooling; senders and receivers; skepticism; uncertain bias; unravelling JEL codes: D44; D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe, nep-law and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:1250

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