Gradualism and Irreversibility

Ben Lockwood and Jonathan Thomas

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper considers a class of two-player dynamic games in which each player controls a one-dimensional variable which we interpret as a level of cooperation. In the base model, there is an irreversibility constraint stating that this variable can never be reduced, only increased. It otherwise satisfies the usual discounted repeated game assumptions.

Keywords: GAME THEORY; PUBLIC GOODS; COOPERATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
Date: 1999
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Related works:
Journal Article: Gradualism and Irreversibility (2002)
Working Paper: GRADUALISM AND IRREVERSIBILITY (1999)
Working Paper: Gradualism and Irreversibility (1999)
Working Paper: Gradualism and Irreversibility (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:525

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