Gradualism and Irreversibility

Ben Lockwood and Jonathan Thomas

The Review of Economic Studies, 2002, vol. 69, issue 2, 339-356

Abstract: This paper considers a class of two-player dynamic games in which each player controls a one-dimensional action variable, interpreted as a level of cooperation. The dynamics are due to an irreversibility constraint: neither player can ever reduce his cooperation level. Payoffs are decreasing in one's own action, increasing in one's opponent's action. We characterize efficient symmetric equilibrium action paths; actions rise gradually over time and converge, when payoffs are smooth, to a level strictly below the one-shot efficient level, no matter how little discounting takes place. The analysis is extended to incorporate sequential moves and asymmetric equilibria. Copyright 2002, Wiley-Blackwell.

Date: 2002
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (75)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/1467-937X.00208 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: GRADUALISM AND IRREVERSIBILITY (1999)
Working Paper: Gradualism and Irreversibility (1999)
Working Paper: Gradualism and Irreversibility (1999)
Working Paper: Gradualism and Irreversibility (1999)
Working Paper: Gradualism and Irreversibility (1999)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:restud:v:69:y:2002:i:2:p:339-356

Access Statistics for this article

The Review of Economic Studies is currently edited by Thomas Chaney, Xavier d’Haultfoeuille, Andrea Galeotti, Bård Harstad, Nir Jaimovich, Katrine Loken, Elias Papaioannou, Vincent Sterk and Noam Yuchtman

More articles in The Review of Economic Studies from Review of Economic Studies Ltd
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().