Replacement Referees and NFL Betting Markets

Bryan McCannon

No 15-20, Working Papers from Department of Economics, West Virginia University

Abstract: Are betting markets efficient? The 2012 labor dispute between the NFL and the referees is used as a quasi-experiment to assess whether the betting markets are able to achieve accurate “prices†in an uncertain environment. More points were scored and underdogs performed relatively better resulting in upsets and closer-than-expected games. Betting markets, though, were unable to anticipate or adjust to this systematic effect even though irregularities in gambling markets were reported before the beginning of the season. Not only were they inefficient, but profitable betting strategies can be identified.

Keywords: betting markets; efficiency; gambling; over-under; replacement referees; spread (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D40 L1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2015-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/cgi/viewcontent ... =econ_working-papers (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 403 Forbidden

Related works:
Journal Article: REPLACEMENT REFEREES AND NFL BETTING MARKETS (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wvu:wpaper:15-20

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Department of Economics, West Virginia University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Feng Yao ().