Leadership and Motivation for Public Goods Contributions
Bryan McCannon ()
No 15-24, Working Papers from Department of Economics, West Virginia University
Results from a leader-follower public goods game are presented. An individual, when randomlyselected to make a contribution knowing that others will observe the selection, gives more than one does in the simultaneous-move public goods game. Followers adopt a quasi-matching strategy where they systematically donate less than the leader, but contribute more when the leader does and contribute less when the leader free rides. The net result is increased provision of a public good when contributions are sequential. The results highlight that psychological preferences, rather than solely social preferences, can explain behavior.
Keywords: experiment; leadership; psychological game theory; public goods; social preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Leadership and motivation for public goods contributions (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wvu:wpaper:15-24
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