Buyers’ Alliances for Bargaining Power

Suchan Chae and Paul Heidhues ()

CIG Working Papers from Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG)

Abstract: We provide a novel explanation as to why forming an alliance of buyers (or sellers) across separate markets can be advantageous when input prices are determined by bargaining. Our explanation helps to understand the prevalence of buyer cooperatives among small and medium sized firms. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Verhandlungsmacht durch Käuferkooperationen) Dieses Papier entwickelt eine neue Erklärung dafür, warum Zusammenschlüsse zwischen Käufern (oder Verkäufern), die in unterschiedlichen Märkten aktiv sind, deren Verhandlungsmacht stärken können. Unser Ansatz kann unter anderem erklären, warum sich kleinere und mittlere Unternehmen oft zu Einkaufsgenossenschaften zusammenschließen.

Keywords: Nash bargaining solution; alternating-offer bargaining; bargaining power; buyer power; cooperatives; input markets. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 L41 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 pages
Date: 2003-12
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Published in the Journal of Economics & Management Strategy , Vol. 13(4), Winter 2004, pp. 731-754.

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Journal Article: Buyers' Alliances for Bargaining Power (2004)
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