Signaling in a Search Market
No 98-50, Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications from Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim
We consider a game of signaling where the informed sender proposes a contract, which can only be accepted or rejected by the receiver. While most of the literature considers a bilaterally monopolistic setting, we embed the game in a search market environment where a sender may switch to another receiver in case of rejection. We show that the set of contracts which may be implemented in an equilibrium converges to the set of least-cost separating contracts as frictions disappear.
Pages: 24 pages
Note: Financial Support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged. I thank Thomas Troeger for substantial help.
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