Decentralized or Collective Bargaining in a Strategy Experiment

Siegfried K. Berninghaus (), Werner Gueth () and Claudia Keser ()
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Siegfried K. Berninghaus: Universität Karlsruhe, Postal: RZ Zirkel 2 D-76128 Karlsruhe
Werner Gueth: Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Strategic Interaction Group, Postal: Kahlaische Straße 10, D-07745 Jena
Claudia Keser: Institut für Statistik und Mathematische Wirtschaftstheorie, Postal: Universität Karlsruhe, Rechenzentrum, Zirkel 2, 76128 Karlsruhe
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Werner Güth ()

No 99-85, Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications from Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim

Abstract: We present an experiment where two players bargain with a third player. They can bargain either separately or form a joint venture to bargain collectively. Our theoretical benchmark solution predicts decentralized bargaining, as only one player has an interest in forming a joint venture. However, we observe a significant amount of collective bargaining. Collective bargaining, when compared with decentralized bargaining, has no significant effect on the payoffs of the players in the joint venture but reduces the payoff of the third player.

Pages: 18 pages
Date: 1999-09-24
Note: Financial Support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged.
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Working Paper: Decentralized or Collective Bargaining in a Strategy Experiment (1999)
Working Paper: Decentralized or collective bargaining in a strategy experiment (1999)
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