Private information in life insurance, annuity and health insurance markets
Health, Econometrics and Data Group (HEDG) Working Papers from HEDG, c/o Department of Economics, University of York
Economic theory predicts that private information on risks in insurance markets leads to adverse selection. To counterbalance private information insurers collect and use information on applicants to assess their risk and calculate premiums in an underwriting process. Using data from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) this paper documents that di erences in the information used in underwriting across life insurance, annuity and health insurance markets attenuate private information to di erent extents. The results are in line with - and might help to reconcile - the mixed empirical evidence on adverse selection across these markets.
Keywords: ELSA; private information; health-related risks; insurance; biomarkers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 I13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-age, nep-hea and nep-ias
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Journal Article: Private Information in Life Insurance, Annuity, and Health Insurance Markets (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:yor:hectdg:14/15
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