Imperfect quality information in a quality-competitive hospital market

Hugh Gravelle and Peter Sivey

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of York

Abstract: We examine the implications of policies to improve information about the qualities of profit seeking duopoly hospitals which face the same regulated price and compete on quality. We show that if the hospital costs of quality are similar then better information increases the quality of both hospitals. However if the costs are sufficiently different improved information will reduce the quality of both hospitals.

Keywords: Uncertain; quality.; Information.; Competition.; Hospitals. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I11 I18 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (37)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.york.ac.uk/media/economics/documents/discussionpapers/2009/0909.pdf Main text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Imperfect Quality Information in a Quality-Competitive Hospital Market (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:yor:yorken:09/09

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of York Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York, York, YO10 5DD, United Kingdom. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Paul Hodgson ().