Efficiency, Stability, and Commitment in Senior Level Job Matching Markets
Ning Sun and
Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of York
We study a senior level job matching model with multiple heterogeneous incumbents and entrants. Incumbents can be committed or uncommitted (i.e., free). A committed agent is an incumbent (firm or worker) who has initially had a partner (worker or firm) and is bound by her commitment. A free agent is an entrant or an incumbent whose relation with by her initial partner is not binding. Every agent tries to find her best possible partner with contract. A committed agent cannot unilaterally dissolve her partnership unless her partner agrees to do so. We examine the problem of how to match workers and firms as well as possible and at the same time to set committed agents free as many as possible without violating their commitments to their partners. We show the existence of (strongly) stable and (strict) core matchings through a constructive algorithm and derive several properties of such outcomes.
Keywords: Matching state; core; stability; commitment; procedure. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 J12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth and nep-lab
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:yor:yorken:18/20
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