Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games

Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin

Yale School of Management Working Papers from Yale School of Management

Abstract: Incomplete information games, local interaction games and random matching games are all special cases of a general class of interaction games (Morris (1997)). In this paper, we use this equivalence to present a unified treatment of arguments generating uniqueness in games with strategic complementarities by introducing heterogeneity in these different settings. We also report on the relation between local and global heterogeneity, on the role of strategic multipliers and on purification in the three types of interaction game.

Keywords: Heterogeneity; Uniqueness; Global Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-07-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm341

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