Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games

Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin

No 1402, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: Incomplete information games, local interaction games and random matching games are all special cases of a general class of interaction games (Morris (1997)). In this paper, we use this equivalence to present a unified treatment of arguments generating uniqueness in games with strategic complementarities by introducing heterogeneity in these different settings. We also report on the relation between local and global heterogeneity, on the role of strategic multipliers and on purification in the three types of interaction game.

Keywords: Heterogeneity; Uniqueness; Global games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2003-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ind
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published in The Economy as an Evolving Complex System III, ed. by L. Blume and S. Durlauf, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 207-242

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