Indeterminacy of Citizen-candidate Equilibrium

John Roemer

Yale School of Management Working Papers from Yale School of Management

Abstract: In a citizen candidate equilibrium, there are n candidates each of whom announces a policy in a policy space of dimension d. Thus the policy equilibrium lives in a space of dimension nd. We show, in a canonical example, that the equilibrium manifold is generically of dimension nd. In particular, the set of equilibria contains an open set in T^n.

Keywords: Citizen-candidate Equilibrium; Political Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-07-28
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Working Paper: Indeterminacy of Citizen-Candidate Equilibrium (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ysm:somwrk:ysm350

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