Indeterminacy of Citizen-Candidate Equilibrium

John Roemer

No 1410, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: In a citizen candidate equilibrium, there are n candidates each of whom announces a policy in a policy space of dimension d. Thus the policy equilibrium lives in a space of dimension nd. We show, in a canonical example, that the equilibrium manifold is generically of dimension nd. In particular, the set of equilibria contains an open set in T^n .

Keywords: Citizen-candidate equilibrium; Political equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2003-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pub
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d14/d1410.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found

Related works:
Working Paper: Indeterminacy of Citizen-candidate Equilibrium (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1410

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
The price is None.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Brittany Ladd ().