Behavioral public choice: A survey
Jan Schnellenbach () and
Christian Schubert ()
No 14/03, Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics from Walter Eucken Institut e.V.
Public choice theory has originally been motivated by the need to correct the asymmetry, widespread in traditional welfare economics, between the motivational assumptions of market participants and policymakers: Those who played the game of politics should also be considered rational and self-interested. History repeats itself with the rise of behavioral economics: Cognitive biases discovered in market participants often induce a call for rational governments to intervene. Recently, however, behavioral economics has also been applied to the explanatory analysis of the political process. This paper surveys the current state of the emerging field of 'behavioral public choice' and considers the scope for further research.
Keywords: Behavioral Public Choice; Behavioral Economics; Rational Irrationality; Cognitive Biases; Social Norms; Voting; Paternalism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A12 D03 D72 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-hpe, nep-pbe and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:aluord:1403
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