James Buchanan's theory of federalism: From fiscal equity to the ideal political order

Lars Feld

No 14/06, Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics from Walter Eucken Institut e.V.

Abstract: The distinct characteristic in James Buchanan's thinking about federalism in contrast to the traditional theory of fiscal federalism is his view about fiscal competition. In this paper, it is demonstrated that this thinking went through three stages. From the 1950s to the beginning of the 1970s, his analyses were well embedded in the traditional fiscal federalism literature and concerned with equity and efficiency issues. In the Leviathan approach starting from the midseventies, he considered competition between jurisdictions as a means to restrict Leviathan governments. In his interpretation of federalism as an ideal political order, Buchanan binds these perspectives together and adds a procedural view: Federalism enables citizens to exert political control, it raises their interest in politics because one vote has more influence, and it facilitates to act morally within their moral capacity.

Keywords: James Buchanan; Fiscal Equity; Fiscal Competition; Federalism as Political Order (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B31 D78 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-his, nep-hpe, nep-pbe and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Journal Article: James Buchanan’s theory of federalism: from fiscal equity to the ideal political order (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:aluord:1406

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