Political economy with a normative purpose: James M. Buchanan's contractarian-constitutionalist research program

Viktor Vanberg

No 26/1, Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics from Walter Eucken Institut e.V.

Abstract: This paper summarizes the core tenets of James M. Buchanan's research program, its contractarianism, dealing with the source from which political orders are to derive their legitimacy, and its contractarianism, specifying the requirements for a political order to operate for the mutual advantage of all participants.

Keywords: Political economy; contractarianism; constitutionalism; legitimacy; mutual advantage; ethics of citizenship (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:aluord:341979

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