EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Strategic sequential voting

Julio González-Díaz, Florian Herold and Diego Domínguez

No 113, BERG Working Paper Series from Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group

Abstract: In this paper, we study the potential implications of a novel yet natural voting system: strategic sequential voting. Each voter has one vote and can choose when to cast his vote. After each voting period, the current count of votes is publicized enabling subsequent voters to use this information. Given the complexity of the general model, in this paper we study a simplified two-period setting. We find that, in elections involving three or more candidates, voters with a strong preference for one particular candidate have a strategic incentive to vote in an early period to signal that candidate's viability. Voters who are more interested in preventing a particular candidate from winning have an incentive to vote in a later period, when they will be better able to tell which other candidate will most likely beat the one they dislike. Strategic sequential voting may therefore result in voters coordinating their choices, mitigating the problem of a Condorcet loser winning an election due to mis-coordination. Furthermore, a (relatively) strong intensity of preferences for the preferred candidate can be partially expressed by voting early, possibly swaying the choice of remaining voters.

Keywords: sequential voting; elections; endogenous timing; strategic timing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D71 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pol
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (6) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/144609/1/864414196.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:bamber:113

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in BERG Working Paper Series from Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by ZBW - German National Library of Economics ().

 
Page updated 2017-09-29
Handle: RePEc:zbw:bamber:113