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Are sequential round-robin tournaments discriminatory?

Marco Sahm

No 121, BERG Working Paper Series from Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group

Abstract: I examine sequential round-robin tournaments with three and four symmetric players. Each player is matched once with each other player. If the matches are organized as Tullock contests (all-pay auctions), the tournament will be almost fair (highly discriminatory): subject to the position of their matches in the sequence of the tournament, the differences in players' ex-ante winning probabilities and expected payoffs will be small (large). The differing results originate from the higher discriminating power of the all-pay auction. Moreover, the resulting discouragement effect in tournaments with all-pay auctions implies lower aggregate effort than in tournaments with suitable Tullock contests. The fairness of round-robin tournaments may be improved by the use of an endogenous sequence of matches or the requirement that players fix their effort ex-ante.

Keywords: Sequential Round-Robin Tournament; Contest Success Function; Discriminatory Power; Tullock Contest; All-Pay Auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 Z20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-spo
Date: 2017
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