Non-Manipulable Domains for the Borda Count

Martin Barbie, Clemens Puppe and Attila Tasnádi

No 13/2003, Bonn Econ Discussion Papers from University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)

Abstract: We characterize the preference domains on which the Borda count satisfies Arrow's ``independence of irrelevant alternatives" condition. Under a weak richness condition, these domains are obtained by fixing one preference ordering and including all its cyclic permutations (``Condorcet cycles"). We then ask on which domains the Borda count is non-manipulable. It turns out that it is non-manipulable on a broader class of domains when combined with appropriately chosen tie-breaking rules. On the other hand, we also prove that the rich domains on which the Borda count is non-manipulable for all possible tie-breaking rules are again the cyclic permutation domains.

Keywords: Borda count; scoring methods; non-manipulability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Journal Article: Non-manipulable domains for the Borda count (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:bonedp:132003

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