Non-manipulable domains for the Borda count

Martin Barbie, Clemens Puppe () and Attila Tasnádi

Economic Theory, 2006, vol. 27, issue 2, 430 pages

Abstract: We characterize the preference domains on which the Borda count satisfies Arrow’s “independence of irrelevant alternatives” condition. Under a weak richness condition, these domains are obtained by fixing one preference ordering and including all its cyclic permutations (“Condorcet cycles”). We then ask on which domains the Borda count is non-manipulable. It turns out that it is non-manipulable on a broader class of domains when combined with appropriately chosen tie-breaking rules. On the other hand, we also prove that the rich domains on which the Borda count is non-manipulable for all possible tie-breaking rules are again the cyclic permutation domains. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006

Keywords: Voting; Borda count; Strategy-proofness; Restricted domains. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0603-4

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